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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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The decision in the principal case is harsh in that it necessitates
circuity of action. Plaintiff can sue only the middleman, who in turn will
sue the ice manufacturer in order to place liability at the point of origin.
The biscuit company is placed in the anomalous position of being
subject to liability without contractual privity, under the Decker rule,
to a consumer who sustains injury by eating unwholesome biscuits.
Yet the company which has been diligent in preventing injury to ultimate consumers by destroying the glass-contaminated dough cannot
recover its loss from the ice manufacturer because of a lack of contractual
privity.27

It is submitted that this privity requirement is law for

28
law's sake.

WILLIAm

H.

MCCULLOUGH

Torts-Charitable Immunity
The doctrine that charitable institutions1 are immune from liability
for torts committed by their servants evolved from dictum set forth in
2
Duncan,v. Findlater,
an English case decided in 1839. This doctrine
was later recognized and followed in England for a brief period; it was
completely discarded in 1866.3
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,4 in 1876, was the
first case to adopt the doctrine in this country, the court holding that
a charity was immune from liability if it had exercised due care in the
selection and retention of its servants. Since that time a majority of
the states have followed the Massachusetts rule, but have differed greatly
of the buyer no longer is required to have privity with the buyer's vendor to
recover for breach of implied warranty. But a suit by a buyer agaiist a remote
vendor is left unchanged, therefore the majority rule requiring privity in such a
situation is left intact. Legislation, 15 U. PiTt. L. REv. 331, 352-55 (1954).
"7Of course plainitiff could sue defendant on grounds of negligence, but in this
case this theory would be quite difficult to prove. PROSSEa, TOarS § 84, at 505
(2d ed. 1955).
28 Spruill, Privily Of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery On Warranty,
19 N.C.L. REv. 551, 565-66 (1941).
1 An institution "is deemed to be eleemosynary or charitable where its property
is derived from charitable gifts or bequests and administered, not for purpose of
gain but in interest of humanity.

. .

."

Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon

College, 31 F.2d 869, 870 (2d Cir. 1929).
6 Clark and Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839).
The dictum of Duncan v. Findlater, supra note 2, was followed in Holliday v.
St. Leonard's, 11 C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861). However, this case was
expressly overruled by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93, 11 Eng.
Rep. 1500 (1866), thus repudiating the doctrine in England. See also Hillyer v.
St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820; Foreman v. Canterbury Corp.,
L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
'120 Mass. 432 (1876). This case was decided ten years after Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, supra note 3, had overruled the doctrine in England; but the
Massachusetts court relies on Holliday v. St. Leonard's, supra note 3.
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both as to the reasons for invoking the rule5 and as to the situations in
which the rule should be applied. 6 However, an examination of recent
'At least five theories have been used in upholding the immunity doctrine.
(1) "Trust Fund" theory. Under this theory the courts refuse recovery on the
ground that the donor intended the funds to be used only for charitable
purposes, and to allo-w them to be diverted therefrom would misappropriate
the fund. See e.g., Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408,
78 AtI. 898 (1910) ; Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885) ; McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, supra note 4; Adams v. University
Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (1907) ; Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd,
120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl 533 (1888).
(2) Inapplicability of respondeat superior. This is based on the theory that a
charity has performed its entire duty when it tenders to a beneficiary a
competent servant, and from that instant he is the servant of the beneficiary
rather than that of the charitable institution. See e.g., Fordyce v. Woman's
Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155 (1906) ; Hearns v.
Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895); Whittaker v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S.W. 1189 (1908).
(3) "Governmental Immunity" theory. Because of close association with the
state, some courts have cloaked charitable institutions with an immunity
like that of the state and its agencies. See e.g., Fordyce v. Woman's
Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, supra; University of Louisville v. Hammock,
127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907) ; Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160
N.W. 173 (1917).
(4) "Implied Waiver" theory. This theory is based on the idea that when one
enters a charitable institution and accepts its services he thereby waives all
right to claim damages for injuries suffered as a result of the negligence
of the institution or its servants. See e.g., Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter
Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P2d 849 (1938); Cook v. John
N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 102 S.W. 847 (1918);
Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 789 (1929).
(5) "Public Policy" theory. Some courts have stated that they are denying
liability because it is against public policy. See e.g., Hearns v. Waterbury
Hospital, supra; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512
(1914); Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785

(1921).

For a discussion of the theories of immunity see Note, 30 N.C.L. Rav. 67
(1951).
6 Some states allow complete immunity from liability. See e.g., Jensen v.
Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, supra note 5(1); Conklin v. John Howard Industrial
Home, 224 Mass. 222, 112 N.E. 606 (1916); Steden v. Jewish Memorial Hospital
Ass'n, 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S.W.2d 469 (1945). Others limit execution of
judgment to nontrust property. See e.g., Saint Mary's Academy v. Solomon 77
Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925) ; Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950);
McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 432, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936).
Some states allow immunity to be invoked as against strangers. See e.g.,
Jackson v. Atlanta Goodwill Industries, 46 Ga. App. 425, 167 S.W. 702 (1933) ;
Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113 (1923). Others
say the immunity doctrine does not apply as against strangers. See e.g., Winona
Technical Institute v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N.E. 393 (1909) ; Bruce v. Central
Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
Immunity does not extend to torts committed by one servant against another
servant, according to some states. See e.g., Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist
Hospitals, Inc., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929). However, other states say the
immunity doctrine does apply in this situation. See e.g., Emery v. Jewish Hospital
Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Reavy v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284
Mass. 300, 187 N.E. 557 (1933).
Some states make no distinction between paying and non-paying beneficiaries,
and say that both are subject to the doctrine of immunity. See e.g., Williams v.
Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1952) ; Gable v. Sisters of
St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910). Others do make such a distinction
and say that a charitable institution is liable to a paying beneficiary. See e.g.,
Sisters of Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938).
For a complete listing of cases, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
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decisions reveals that an increasing number of jurisdictions have held
charities liable for the torts of their servants on the same basis as
privately operated institutions, 7 reaching this result either (1) by
initially refusing to follow the doctrine of immunity, or, more important,
(2) by overruling earlier decisions which did follow the rule.
Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary8 is a recent decision exemplifying this modern trend. In this case the plaintiff sought to recover against the defendant hospital, a charitable institution, for injuries
allegedly due to the negligence of the hospital's servant. The lower
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, relying on D'Amato v.
Orange Menwrial Hospital,9 the case establishing the doctrine of
charitable immunity in New Jersey. On appeal, the decision was reversed. The supreme court, in reviewing the various theories of immunity, 10 decided that the only one which could be considered valid was
the "public policy" theory. As to this theory, the court stated:
It may perhaps be that when D'Anato was rendered in 1925 it
accurately represented the then prevailing notions of public
policy. But times and circumstances have changed"1 and we do
not believe that it faithfully represents current notions of rightness
and fairness. Due care is expected of all, and when an organiza"President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th
Cir. 1941); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951);
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) ; St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n
v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952) ; Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46
Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (Super. Ct. 1951) ; Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So.
2d 40 (Fla. 1953) ; Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60,
297 P.2d 1041 (1956) ; Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45
N.W.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934
(1954); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverin, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W.
699 (1920) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142
(1951) ; Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (Sup. Ct.
1939) ; Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (Sup.
Ct. 1958) ; Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1957) ; Richbeil
v. Grafton Deaconness Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946) ; Avellone v.
St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956) ; Gable v. Salvation
Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940); Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12
RI. 141 (1879); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(1950); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
260 P.2d 765 (1953).
8 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
9 101 N.J.L. 61, 127 Atl. 340 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
10 See note 5 supra.
Charitable institutions themselves have changed since the rule was initiated.
"Then they were largely small institutions, many connected with churches, and
of limited means. Today they have become, in many instances, big businesses,
handling large funds, managing and owning large properties and set up by large
trusts or foundations. It is idle to argue that donations for them will dry up if
the charity is held to respond for its torts the same as other institutions or that
the donors are giving the funds or setting up large foundations for charitable
purposes with the expectation that the charities they benefit will not be responsible
like other institutions for negligent injury. Such charities enjoy endowments and
resources beyond anything thought of when the matter of immunity was first
being considered." Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 134, 70 A.2d
230, 236 (1950).
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tion's negligent conduct injures another there should, in all
justice and equity, be a basis for recovery
12 without regard to
whether the defendant is a private charity.
Thus, New Jersey, by overruling its prior decisions, effectively abandoned
the doctrine of charitable immunity.
This same result was reached a year earlier in a New York decision,13
where the court, reasoning along the same lines as the New Jersey court,
rejected the immunity doctrine, stating that "a distinction unique in the
14
law should rest on stronger foundations than those advanced.'
Courts generally have not gone from the extreme of full immunity to
no immunity in one decision. Instead, the process usually follows this
pattern: (1) the courts initially state the general rule that charitable
institutions are immune from liability if they exercise due care in selecting
and retaining their servants; (2) the rule, thus established, is "devoured"
by many exceptions;15 and (3) from this point, the rule is then completely discarded. This is borne out by the developments leading up to
the principal case. 16
This "devouring" of the rule by exceptions, evidenced by the great
variance of rules and reasons therefor, is a strong indication that
something is wrong and that correction, though in process, is incomplete. 17 In such a state of flux, it would seem that the rule should be
critically re-examined by all courts as to its fundamental soundness and
compatibility with present day needs and modern ideas of justice.' 8
North Carolina first held to the general rule that the only duty
imposed on the charitable institution was that of exercising reasonable
care in selecting and retaining its servants ;19 then an exception was made
whereby an injured servant of a charitable institution did not have to
show lack of due care in selection or retention of the negligent servant
12 27 N.J. at 39, 141 A.2d at 282.
13 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1957). This recent
decision destroyed the last remnants of charitable immunity in New York.

" Bing v. Thunig, supra note 13 at 663, 143 N.E.2d at 7.

Judged by results
'" "The 'rule' has not held in the tests of time and decision.
President and Directors of Georgetown
it has been devoured in 'exceptions.'"
College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"'The rule was laid down in D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 101
N.J.L. 61, 127 Atl. 230 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925). An exception as to strangers was
made in Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 170 Atl.
237 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934). Recovery by a servant was allowed. Rose v.
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 136 N.J.L. 553, 57 A.2d 29 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948). Thus only the "beneficiaries" of charities were barred from recovery at the time of the Collopy case, note 8 supra.
"' President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
18 "[S] tare decisis has no legitimate application to doctrines of the law of torts
built upon a mistaken foundation persisting in the books after that foundation has
been undermined, which are out of accord with general principles recognized today,
so that if they are rejected the general law is clarified rather than unsettled."
13 NACCA L.J. 23 (1954).
" Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 152 N.C. 318, 67 S.E. 971 (1910).
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as a prerequisite to recovery ;20 and it would seem that charitable immunity would not be invoked as against a stranger to the charity, 2'
although there is no case in North Carolina holding squarely on this
point. Thus when Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc.22 came before
the court, the immunity rule of North Carolina was very similar to that
in New Jersey when the principal case arose. However, the North
Carolina court adopted a much different attitude from that taken by
the court in the principal case. 23 The New Jersey court carefully reviewed the theories of immunity and then discarded the doctrine entirely. The North Carolina court merely mentioned the "trust fund,"
"implied waiver," and "public policy" theories and refused to discuss
their merits or demerits. It did agree that they may be subject to some
meritorious criticism, but said that "the numerical weight of authority
is on the side of immunity." Then it stated that a number of jurisdictions
have reached the same result as that of qualified immunity by holding the
doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable as between the charity and
24
its employees.
Since the latter theory is discussed separately and approved by the
court, the inapplicability of respondeat superior to charitable institutions, 25 as against beneficiaries of such institutions, is apparently the
basis for the doctrine of immunity in North Carolina.
One's liability for the negligence of his alleged servant is generally
determined by his right and power to direct and control the servant in
the performance of his duty at the instant the negligent act or omission
occurs.2 6

Applying this test to the situation where the negligence of

an employee of a charity results in an injury to a beneficiary, it seems
clear that the charity, having the right and power to direct and control
its employees, would be the true master; it is only through the use of a
legal fiction that the beneficiary can be said to be the master in such a
situation.2 7 There is no sound legal principle under which respondeat
superior should be held inapplicable to a charitable institution and at
28
the same time applicable to an institution privately owned and operated.
Thus, it appears that the inapplicability of respondeat superior to charitable institutions is as indefensible as the other theories of immunity
20 Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672
(1929).
21

See Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E.2d

662 (1951) (by implication).
22237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).

"For a discussion of the North Carolina law on this subject, see Note, 32

N.C.L. RFv. 129 (1953).
24237 N.C. at 390, 75 S.E.2d at 305.
22 See note 5 supra.
2 P. F. Collier & Son Distributing Corp. v. Drinkwater, 81 F2d 200, 202 (4th

Cir.', 1936).
Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
28 Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 106, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).
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which, as the North Carolina court has agreed, may be "subject to some
measure of meritorious criticism."
However, the court indicates that even if respondeat superior were
applicable, the principle of stare decisis would require that any departure
made from the rule of immunity be made by the legislature-due to the
great weight of authority in North Carolina established over many
years.2 9 But, if the reasons for the rule are at best doubtful, why should
stare decisis be applied without at least reviewing the rule? North
Carolina has agreed that: "Where vital and important public or private
rights are concerned, and the decisions regarding them are to have a
direct and permanent influence on all future time, it becomes the duty
as well as the right of the court to consider them carefully and to allow
no previous error to continue, if it can be corrected."3 0
Though declaration of public policy is primarily a legislative function,
the courts also have authority to declare a public policy which already
exists-and to base their decisions on that ground. 8 ' Immunity,
basically unsound under all legal theories, could only have been created
by the courts in response to what appeared at the time to be proper as
a matter of public policy.3 2 Therefore, when the need for such a public
policy no longer obtains, the court should declare that it no longer
exists; and especially is this true where it was initiated by the courts
instead of the legislature. 88
For negligent or tortious conduct, liability is the rule, and immunity
the exception. 34 The avowed purpose of the rule of immunity is to
protect the charity. Actually, it clothes charitable and non-profit organizations with special privileges not available to other organizations8 5
It seems clear that most authorities would agree today that: (1) the need
for the rule no longer exists; (2) the underlying reasons for the rule
are not valid; and (3) the charitable institution is no longer the small
institution it was when the rule was initially formulated. This being
true, why should not the law itself-even assuming it to have been justifiable when initially made--change so as to reflect these facts?
9 Williams

v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).

Prior to this case, there were three cases in which all of the necessary elementsa charitable institution, a beneficiary, and a servant who, though carefully selected
and retained, had been negligent-were present: Williams v. Union County Hospital

Ass'n, 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E.2d 662 (1951) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217 N.C. 610, 8
S.E.2d 914 (1940) ; Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 152 N.C. 318, 67 S.E. 971

(1910).
"0Mason v. A. E. Nelson Cotton Co., 148 N.C. 492, 510, 62 S.E. 625, 631
(19)ay v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
22

Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).

33 Ibid.

",President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
22 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
8

But see, Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d
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This is the attitude taken by the New Jersey court in the principal
case. It is submitted that this should be the attitude taken by any
court in reviewing the subject.
To11MAs

L. NoRuis, JR.

Torts--Lookout-Duty to Maintain at Green Light
In the recent case of Currin v. Williams,1 plaintiff entered the intersection with a green light in his favor but without maintaining a lookout
for traffic approaching on the intersecting street. Defendant entered the
intersection from plaintiff's left while the traffic control signal facing
him was red. Though not conclusive, there was some evidence to support a conclusion that had plaintiff looked he would have been put on
notice that defendant was not going to stop. Held: Plaintiff's failure to
look to the right and the left when he entered the intersection on the
green light was not contributory negligence as a matter of law, but the
issue of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury.
Since, in accidents of this nature, failure to maintain a lookout is
invariably alleged, it is essential that attorneys know (1) what is meant
by lookout,2 (2) what constitutes the motorist's duty to maintain a
lookout, and (3) what effect automatic traffic signals have upon that

duty.
In its inception, lookout was probably a nautical term designating
that member of a ship's crew charged with the duty of keeping watch
for danger. 8 Stated quite simply, the duty of a motorist to maintain a
lookout is analogous to the duty of that crew member; the motorist
must keep watch for possible danger. 4 Quite naturally, one indispen162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953). There the court says: "Ordinarily, when a court decides
to modify or abandon a court made rule of long standing, it starts out by saying
that 'the reason for the rule no longer exists.' In this case it is correct to say
that the 'reason' originally given for the rule of immunity never did exist." Id.
at 167, 260 P.2d at 768.
1248 N.C. 32, 102 S.E.2d 455 (1958).
' One of a number of descriptive words usually accompanies the word lookout.
See, e.g., Wright v. Ponitz, 44 Cal. App. 2d 215, 112 P.2d 25 (1941) (ordinary
careful lookout) ; Wilder v. Cadle, 227 Ky. 486, 13 S.W.2d 497 (1929) (reasonable
lookout) ; Broussard v. Hotard, 4 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1941) (sharp lookout) ;
Wright v. Pegram, 244 N.C. 45, 92 S.E.2d 416 (1956) (proper lookout) ; Murray v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E.2d 326 (1940) (reasonably careful
lookout).
'See Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 65 N.W.2d 553 (1954).
'There are four classes of hazards which the motorist must guard against:
(1) defects or hazards of the road surface, (2) objects or persons standing or
moving in the path of the approaching vehicle, (3) . objects or hazards which,
without negligence, may enter or attempt to enter the path of the vehicle prior to,
or at the time of, its passage, (4) objects or persons which negligently enter or
attempt to enter the path of the vehicle prior to, or at the time of, its
passage. Barrett, Mechanics of Control and Lookout in Automobile Law, 14
TuL L. Rtv. 493, 507 (1940).

